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Spatial	disparities	in	income	and	worklessness	across	areas	of	the	European	Union	are	profound	and	
persistent.	Concerns	about	these	disparities,	and	the	appropriate	policy	response,	are	longstanding.	
Two	trends	have	re-energized	popular	and	academic	debate.	One	is	economic:	on	some	dimensions,	
disparities	have	stopped	narrowing	and	started	to	grow.	The	other	is	political:	some	argue	that	
persistent	disparities	cause	discontent	and	help	explain	the	rise	in	populist	movements	(Rodriguez-
Pose	2018).		
We	focus	on	disparities	in	income	and	worklessness	across	EU	metropolitan	regions,	commonly	
called	“metros,”	using	new	definitions	from	OECD	and	Eurostat.	As	these	metros	account	for	around	
two-thirds	of	population,	and	larger	and	growing	shares	of	employment	and	GDP,	their	economic	
performance	is	crucial	for	understanding	EU	disparities.	Focusing	on	them	also	narrows	down	the	
area-based	policies	that	are	relevant.	It	means	we	have	less	to	say	about	rural-urban	disparities	
which	involve	different	economic	mechanisms	and	policies.	
Our	metro	definition	is	based	on	the	so-called	NUTS3	regions,	which	divide	up	Europe	into	areas	of	
150,000	to	800,000	people.	Our	data	combines	these	areas	into	metro	regions:	groups	of	NUTS3	
sharing	a	common	labour	market	and	meeting	a	minimum	size	threshold.	We	focus	mostly	on	the	
“EU-15”,	which	is	the	group	of	15	countries	in	the	EU	at	the	end	of	2003,	before	the	EU	expanded	to	
central	and	eastern	Europe.	We	also	offer	some	comparisons	to	the	“EU-28”,	referring	to	the	total	
number	of	EU	countries	before	the	departure	of	the	UK,	and	to	the	US	economy.		
We	begin	by	providing	evidence	that	differences	in	GDP	per	capita	across	EU-15	metros	converged	in	
the	1980s,	stabilized	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	and	have	been	diverging	since	the	mid-2000s.	We	
also	show	diverging	patterns	of	worklessness.		
We	then	turn	to	research	in	urban	economics	for	a	theories	and	empirical	evidence	that	help	explain	
the	factors	driving	these	disparities.	We	will	show	that	bigger	cities	pay	higher	wages	(the	‘urban	
wage	premium’)	because	they	make	workers	more	productive.	They	also	tend	to	attract	more	
educated	workers	who	are	more	productive	and	earn	more.		As	a	result,	GDP	per	capita	is	higher	in	
bigger	cities.	These	two	factors	reinforce	one	another,	because	the	urban	wage	premium	increases	
with	education.	Both	factors	play	a	role	in	the	EU	in	explaining	the	level	and	evolution	of	spatial	
disparities.	We	provide	evidence	that	real	estate	costs	increase	with	city	size,	with	implications	for	
real	wage	inequalities	and	whether	area-level	improvements	in	productivity	capitalize	into	higher	
house	prices.	We	also	explore	low	mobility	rates	in	Europe,	and	differences	in	labour	market	
regulations,	which	help	explain	why	employment	disparities	are	more	pronounced	than	for	income.		
Do	these	profound	spatial	disparities	justify	place-based	policies	aimed	at	reducing	them	(Austin	et	
al	2018)?	Neumark	and	Simpson	(2015)	provide	a	useful	overview	of	the	literature	on	place-based	
policies.	We	focus	on	several	policies	which	directly	target	spatial	differences.	Our	emphasis	is	on	
policies	that	work	at	broad	spatial	scales.	We	argue	that	it	is	important	to	differentiate	between	
policies	as	they	operate	via	different	mechanisms	and	yield	different	trade-offs	between	spatial	
inequality	and	aggregate	efficiency.	
We	start	with	EU	cohesion	policy.	These	convergence	transfers	appear	to	have	fostered	growth	in	
supported	areas	and	thus	reduced	income	disparities,	but	the	effects	vary	considerably	across	areas	
with	the	positive	effects	driven	by	areas	with	high	human	capital	and	high-quality	local	government.	
The	evidence	also	finds	decreasing	returns	from	transfers.	The	changes	in	disparities	over	time	
suggest	that	the	economic	forces	swamp	the	impact	of	EU	policy.	We	then	consider	two	major	items	
of	expenditure	within	total	cohesion	policy	spending:	transport	and	support	for	firms	from	capital	
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subsidies.	Finally,	we	consider	enterprise	zones	and	local	employment	multipliers	for	different	kinds	
of	private	and	public	sector	employment.		
Europe	has	a	long	tradition	of	using	place-based	policies	to	support	lagging	regions	and	to	address	
local	downward	spirals	following	structural	change.	While	place-based	policies	did	not	prevent	
increasing	disparities	in	Europe,	they	may	have	modestly	mitigated	them.		
	
The	Evolution	of	Spatial	Disparities	across	European	Cities	
A	comprehensive	literature	discusses	regional	disparities	in	Europe.	Much	of	this	uses	data	on	
“NUTS2	regions”	of	800,000	to	3	million	inhabitants	which	also	determine	eligibility	for	the	main	EU	
structural	funds.	In	contrast,	we	use	data	on	metro	regions.	As	argued	above,	one	reason	for	this	is	
the	economic	importance	of	these	metros,	and	their	role	in	driving	EU	spatial	disparities.	
The	other	reasons	for	using	metros	are	analytical,	but	important.	The	economic	literature	on	spatial	
disparities	emphasizes	the	need	to	think	about	the	appropriate	spatial	unit.	For	example,	functional	
urban	areas	tied	together	by	flows	of	people	and	goods	should	be	used	to	think	about	local	labour	
markets.	But,	for	many	EU	countries,	NUTS2	regions	do	not	approximate	functional	urban	areas.	For	
example,	London	is	split	into	five	NUTS2	regions	and	merging	just	these	regions—so	that	the	London	
metro	is	a	single	geographic	unit—changes	one	commonly	used	measure	of	dispersion	across	the	
EU-15	by	29	percent.	Moreover,	NUTS2	cover	disparate	areas:	comparing	London,	Paris,	and	
Munich,	with	the	agricultural	areas	of	Ireland,	the	beaches	of	Andalusia	and	the	mountains	of	Tyrol.	
The	economic	theories	that	explain	disparities	across	cities,	countryside,	beaches,	and	mountains	
are	broad.	Such	breadth	also	widens	the	relevant	place-based	policies.	
For	these	economic	and	analytical	reasons,	we	focus	on	spatial	disparities	across	metropolitan	
regions	(‘metros’)	using	the	recent	EC/OECD	specification	(OECD	2019).1 	As	described	in	the	
introduction,	our	data	defines	metros	using	NUTS3,	or	aggregates	of	NUTS3.	For	the	EU-15	in	2015	
(the	latest	date	for	which	there	is	data),	there	are	226	metros	with	a	minimum	population	of	
250,000	and	a	maximum	of	13.9	million.	For	the	broader	EU-28,	we	have	279	metros.	In	2015,	
metros	account	for	64	percent	of	the	population	in	the	EU15	(60	percent	for	the	EU-28),	and	a	
higher	share	of	employment	and	GDP.		
One	important	headline	indicator	of	disparities,	because	it	determines	eligibility	for	the	main	EU	
Cohesion	Policy	funds	(discussed	in	detail	later),	is	whether	a	NUTS2	region	has	GDP	per	capita	less	
than	75	percent	of	the	EU	average.	Applying	this	indicator	to	EU-15	metros,	32	of	226	metros,	home	
to	12.5	percent	of	the	metro	population,	are	below	75	percent	of	the	average	GDP	per	capita.	For	
the	EU-28,	the	corresponding	figures	are	51	out	of	279	metros	and	14	percent.	In	the	US,	a	similar	
proportion	of	metro	areas	(70	out	of	384;	as	defined	by	the	US	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis)	have	
per	capita	GDP	that	is	75	percent	or	less	of	the	national	average	but	account	for	only	7	percent	of	
the	metro	population.	In	the	EU,	people	are	much	more	likely	to	live	in	poorer	metros	than	in	the	
US.	This	hints	at	the	role	mobility	plays	in	understanding	EU	disparities.	
The	coefficient	of	variation—	the	standard	deviation	divided	by	the	mean—is	a	standard	measure	of	
dispersion.	Figure	1	plots	the	(unweighted)	coefficients	of	variation	of	GDP	per	capita	across	EU-15,	
EU-28	and	US	metros	over	the	last	four	decades.	In	2015,	the	coefficient	of	variation	was	0.28	for	the	
	
1	The	online	Appendix	provides	information	on	data	sources,	descriptive	statistics	and	additional	figures.	It	also	
provides	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	disparities	across	NUTS2	regions.	
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EU-15,	0.33	for	the	EU-28.	EU	disparities	appear	to	be	higher	than	US,	although	the	coefficients	of	
variation	are	not	directly	comparable:	for	the	US	we	used	income	(not	GDP)	per	capita	and	Bureau	of	
Economic	Analysis	(BEA)	metros,	rather	than	the	OECD	definition.	We	experimented	with	using	BEA	
data,	weighted	by	area	shares,	to	approximate	the	OECD	metro	definition.	However,	the	
approximation	is	imprecise,	so	we	focus	on	comparing	trends	rather	than	levels.	The	appendix	
provides	a	figure	using	comparable	OECD	metro	area	definitions	applied	to	the	US	(for	a	shorter	time	
period),	which	shows	that	the	coefficient	of	variation	for	the	EU15	metros	is	15%	larger	than	for	the	
US	(see	Figure	A1).		These	differences	are	bigger	if	we	include	non-metro	areas	as	the	least	
productive	rural	areas	in	the	EU	are	less	productive	(relative	to	the	EU	mean)	than	the	least	
productive	rural	areas	in	the	US	(relative	to	the	US	mean).	
Figure	1		
Coefficient	of	Variation	of	GDP	per	capita	–	EU15,	EU28	and	US	Metros	
	
Source:	Authors	
Notes:	Calculations	based	on	Eurostat	and	BEA	data	and	metro	definitions	as	described	in	the	text.	EU15	and	
EU28	calculations	use	GDP	per	capita;	US	uses	income	per	capita.	
	
Variation	across	EU-15	and	EU-28	countries	explains	around	half	the	coefficient	of	variation	for	
metro	areas	—44	percent	and	50	percent,	respectively	(based	on	decomposing	the	squared	
coefficient	of	variation).	EU-15	disparities	fell	in	the	1980s,	stabilised	in	the	1990s,	fell	again	in	the	
early	2000s,	then	increased	from	the	mid-2000s	and	markedly	after	the	double	dip	recession.	For	the	
EU-28	the	coefficient	of	variation	fell	somewhat	when	new	members	joined	and	then	remained	at	
similar	levels	until	2015.		
Disparities	in	income	per	capita	across	US	metros	started	widening	around	1995,	roughly	a	decade	
before	the	EU-15.	But	since	about	2004,	the	trends	are	relatively	similar.	From	their	lowest	value	in	
2004,	EU-15	disparities	have	increased	by	18	percent,	compared	with	12	percent	in	the	US	over	the	
same	period).	For	the	EU28,	we	observe	a	much	higher	level	of	disparities,	but	the	short	time	series	
makes	it	hard	to	assess	the	longer	run	trend,	which	is	why	our	focus	is	on	the	EU-15.	
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This	rise	in	inequality	across	metros	is	especially	striking	because	it	follows	a	longer	period	of	
convergence	across	European	regions	in	per	capita	income.	Rosés	and	Wolf	(2019)	provide	estimates	
of	regional	GDP	per	capita	for	a	mixture	of	NUTS	1	and	2	regions	(excluding	Greece),	and	show	a	31	
percent	decrease	in	the	coefficient	of	variation	between	1950	and	1980.		
Another	measure	of	convergence	focuses	on	whether	on	average	poor	metros	grow	faster	than	rich	
metros	by	regressing	growth	rates	of	GDP	per	capita	on	initial	levels,	where	the	regression	
coefficient	measures	the	extent	to	which	regions	are	moving	toward	the	mean	level	of	per	capita	
income	(often	referred	to	as	beta-convergence.)	Running	such	regressions	for	1980-2015	or	for	
1990-2015,	we	find	evidence	of	significant	mean-reversion,	but	for	2005-2015,	we	find	divergence	
instead	(see	Figure	A2).	Such	findings	reinforce	the	message	that	a	longer-term	pattern	of	mean-
reversion	of	per	capita	income	across	the	EU-15	has	stalled	and	even	reversed	itself.	This	is	similar	to	
results	for	US	states	(Ganong	and	Shoag	2017)	although	mean-reversion	ended	around	15	years	
before	it	did	in	the	EU.	
Figure	2		
Coefficient	of	variation	of	worklessness	–	EU	Metros		
	
Source:	Authors	
Notes:	Metro	definitions	as	defined	in	the	text.	
Other	measures	of	economic	performance	show	similar	patterns.	The	rates	of	employment	and	
worklessness	(that	is,	of	not	working	in	the	working	age	population)	also	vary	substantially.	As	
shown	in	Figure	2,	for	EU-15	metros,	the	coefficient	of	variation	of	worklessness	increased	from	0.31	
in	2000	to	0.41	in	2015.	Over	the	same	period	the	level	and	trend	are	similar	for	the	EU-28.2	This	
variation	in	worklessness	has	been	of	long-standing	interest	in	Europe	and	is	receiving	increased	
attention	in	the	US.	For	example,	Austin	et	al.	(2018)	show	that	US	disparities	in	worklessness	rates	
are	pronounced	and	have	increased	in	the	last	decade.		
	
2	For	the	EU-28	there	is	a	longer	time	series	of	data	on	worklessness	than	there	was	for	GDP	per-capita	so	we	
can	look	at	the	evolution	over	the	same	time-period	as	for	the	EU-15.	Regressing	the	rate	of	worklessness	in	
2015	on	the	rate	in	2005	gives	a	slope	of	1.19	for	EU-15	metros,	suggesting	that,	as	for	GDP	per	capita,	the	
recent	past	has	seen	divergence	of	worklessness.	The	same	regression	gives	a	coefficient	of	1.07	for	the	EU-28.	
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Disparities	in	EU	worklessness	rates	are	more	pronounced	than	those	for	GDP	per-capita:	the	
coefficient	of	variation	for	per-capita	GDP	in	2015	is	0.28	and	for	worklessness	0.41.	As	with	GDP	per	
capita,	variation	in	per	country	worklessness	explain	around	half	the	total	variation	(51	percent).		
	
What	Causes	Geographical	Disparities	in	Europe?	
EU	metros	exhibit	wide	and	persistent	disparities	in	GDP	per	capita	and	in	worklessness,	and	these	
disparities	appear	to	be	widening.	To	understand	these	disparities,	the	standard	approach	in	urban	
economics	is	to	think	about	firms	and	workers	trading	off	productivity	advantages	of	different	cities	
against	the	costs	of	locating	in	those	cities.	(Urban	amenities	may	play	a	role,	too,	but	we	sidestep	
that	issue.)		
Figure	3		
Agglomeration	and	Urban	Costs	–	EU	metros	
	
Panel	a)	Agglomeration	elasticity	 	 	 										Panel	b)	Urban	cost	elasticity	
Source:	Authors.	
Note:	City	size	is	number	of	workers	in	panel	(a)	and	population	in	panel	(b).	For	panel	(a)	given	variations	in	
worklessness,	we	use	GDP	per	worker	and	number	of	workers,	rather	than	GDP	per	capita	and	population.	
Panel	(b)	uses	data	for	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Spain	and	the	UK	and	includes	country	fixed	effects	to	account	
for	differences	in	real	estate	price	indices.	Deviations	in	the	log	real	estate	index	from	the	country	mean	are	on	
the	y-axis,	deviations	in	log	populations	from	the	country	mean	are	on	the	x-axis.	Panel	(a)	uses	data	from	
2015,	panel	(b)	from	2011	(Italy	has	no	2015	data).	Results	are	robust	to	using	2015	and	excluding	Italy.	For	
details,	see	the	online	Appendix.	
	
	
Metro	Disparities	in	Productivity	and	Land	Prices	
A	substantial	literature	suggests	urban	size	is	an	important	source	both	of	productivity	advantages	
and	of	higher	congestion	and	land	costs.	As	an	illustration,	Figure	3	shows	that	city	size	is	positively	
associated	with	GDP	per	worker	and	real	estate	prices.	For	2015,	regressing	the	log	of	GDP	per	
worker	on	the	log	of	city	size	gives	an	elasticity	—the	slope	of	the	line	in	the	figure	—	of	0.077.	For	
the	real	estate	index	in	2011,	the	elasticity	is	0.930.3		
Because	of	the	considerable	wage	premium	earned	by	“college	educated”	the	relationship	of	GDP	
per	capita	with	city	size	overstates	productivity	benefits	if	workers	sort	across	cities	so	higher	
	
3	This	second	elasticity	looks	low	compared	to	country-level	estimates	reported	in	Ahlfeldt	and	Pietrostefani	
(2019).	This	is	not	surprising	given	that	we	pool	together	quite	different	data.	
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educated	live	in	bigger	more	productive	cities	(as	argued	in	Combes	et	al.	2008).	We	see	such	sorting	
in	our	data:	Regressing	metro	GDP	per	worker	on	the	share	of	population	with	tertiary	education	
and	absorbing	country	fixed	effects	gives	a	coefficient	of	0.015	(i.e.	a	1	percentage	point	increase	in	
the	share	educated	increases	GDP	per	worker	by	1.5	percent).4	Individual	country-level	studies	
control	for	such	sorting	on	both	observed	characteristics	(e.g.	share	college	educated)	and	
unobserved	characteristics	(e.g.	share	high	ability)	using	individual	panel	data—that	is,	following	
specific	workers	over	time.	Unfortunately,	no	such	panel	data	is	available	for	the	EU-15.	However,	if	
we	re-estimate	the	relationship	between	GPD	per	capita	and	city	size	controlling	for	the	share	
tertiary	educated,		the	elasticity	falls	from	0.077	to	0.069.		
Sorting	and	city	size	reinforce	one	another	because	more	educated	people	live	in	more	productive	
cities.	Using	US	data,	Moretti	(2013)	shows	that	the	college	wage	premium	is	larger	in	big	cities,	a	
result	we	can	replicate	using	less	detailed	individual	level	data	from	the	EU.	5	The	assortative	
matching	of	firms	and	workers	may	partially	explain	this	effect	(for	discussion,	see	Card	et	al.	2013;	
Dauth	et	al.	2019).		
Explaining	the	Changes	in	Disparities	over	Time?	
If	variations	in	city	size	and	in	the	composition	of	educated	workers	help	explain	disparities	across	
EU-15	metros,	can	a	simple	urban	model	also	explain	the	changes	over	time?		
Table	1	suggests	a	partial	answer	by	looking	at	how	the	estimated	elasticity	of	GDP	per	worker	
changes	over	time	with	respect	to	metro	size.	As	convergence	slowed,	and	then	reversed	the	size-
elasticity	increased	markedly.	In	column	2,	we	control	for	sorting	using	the	share	of	population	with	
a	tertiary	education,	in	periods	when	we	have	data.	This	has	a	relatively	small	effect	on	the	
agglomeration	elasticities,	although	the	effect	does	seem	to	be	increasing	over	time.	It	is	difficult	to	
be	precise	because	of	the	measurement	error	introduced	by	the	way	we	must	calculate	tertiary	
education	shares	(see	footnote	6).	
	 	
	
4	Tertiary	education	data	is	only	available	from	2000	onwards	for	NUTS2.	We	compute	the	shares	for	metros	
by	assigning	each	NUTS3	the	corresponding	NUTS2	education	shares.	For	14	metros,	which	only	have	data	
from	2005	on,	we	impute	shares	using	a	model	with	metro	fixed	effects	and	a	linear	time	trend.	
5	Using	data	from	the	EU	Statistics	on	Income	and	Living	Conditions	(EU	SILC),	we	run	Mincer-style	regressions	
including	a	city	residence	indicator	interacted	with	a	tertiary	education	indicator.	The	positive	coefficient	on	
the	interaction	suggests	a	higher	tertiary	education	premium	in	cities	(see	Table	A3).	Grujovic	(2019)	provides	
similar	evidence	with	German	data.	Regressions	using	the	EU	SILC	data	show	the	high-skilled	are	9.5	percent	
more	likely	to	live	in	a	city	than	the	average	and	the	effect	has	been	increasing	somewhat	since	the	start	of	the	
data	in	2005	(see	Table	A4).	
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Table	1		
Agglomeration	elasticity:	EU-15	Metros	
	
Year	 Agglomeration	elasticity		 Agglomeration	elasticity	
conditional	tertiary	education	
share	
1980	 0.0429	(0.0260)	 .	
1990	 0.0517	(0.0175)	 .	
2000	 0.0778	(0.0136)	 0.0764	(0.0135)	
2010	 0.0835	(0.0122)	 0.0791	(0.0123)	
2015	 0.0774	(0.0132)	 0.0686	(0.0134)	
Source:	Authors	
Note:	Coefficients	from	regression	of	log	GDP	per	worker	on	log	number	of	workers	controlling	for	share	
tertiary	educated	(column	2).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		
	
We	can	look	more	directly	at	sorting	by	considering	changes	in	the	“college	educated”	wage	
premium	and	in	the	spatial	concentration	of	skilled	workers.	For	some	EU	countries,	the	university	
graduate	premium	has	increased	(Machin	and	van	Reenen	2007;	Dustmann	et	al.	2009)	which	
directly	increases	disparities	between	smaller	and	bigger	cities	as	the	latter	employ	more	highly	
educated	workers.		
Changes	in	the	spatial	concentration	of	highly	educated	workers	reinforce	the	increase	in	the	
“college	educated”	wage	premium.	In	EU-15	metros,	the	share	of	population	with	a	tertiary	
education	increased	by	about	10	percentage	points	between	2000	and	2015.	This	increase	was	not	
equally	distributed	across	metros.	Regressing	the	log	growth	of	tertiary	education	shares	on	the	log	
of	initial	population	and	including	country	fixed	effects	shows	that	a	10	percent	increase	in	initial	
metro	population	is	associated	with	a	rise	of	13.6	percent	in	the	share	tertiary	educated	over	the	
period	(see	Figure	A3).	That	is,	we	see	increased	sorting	of	the	more	educated	population	consistent	
with	US	evidence	(Moretti,	2004	and	Berry	and	Glaeser,	2005).	This	increasing	concentration	of	
more	educated	workers	is	reflected	in	increased	concentration	of	skill-intensive	employment.	For	
example,	using	patents	as	a	proxy	for	skill-intensive	employment,	we	see	increased	spatial	
concentration	between	the	early	1990s	and	early	2010s	(see	Figure	A4).			
What	explains	the	increasing	concentration	of	more	educated	workers	in	big	cities?	One	factor	is	the	
shift	from	manufacturing	to	knowledge-intensive	services:	the	employment	share	of	knowledge	
intensive	services	and	high	technology	manufacturing	increased	in	the	EU	from	2000-15	by	around.	
16	percent.	This	shift	was	caused	by	a	mixture	of	increased	globalisation	(like	the	“China	shock,”	as	
in	Autor	et	al.,	2013;	Dauth	and	Suedekum,	2016)	and	technological	change	and	increased	
automation	(Acemoglu	and	Restrepo	2019;	Dauth	et	al.	2019).	As	knowledge-intensive	services	
employ	more	educated	workers	and	benefit	from	higher	agglomeration	economies	this	structural	
shift	should	see	increased	concentration	of	more	educated	workers	in	big	cities.		
An	inelastic	supply	of	housing	in	growing	and	more	productive	metros	also	plays	a	role.	High	house	
prices	prevent	the	poor,	who	spend	a	higher	income	share	on	housing,	from	moving	to	more	
productive	areas	(Ganong	and	Shoag	2017).	In	some	EU	metros,	land	use	constraints	are	highly	
restrictive	and	increase	house	prices	(Hilber	and	Vermeulen,	2016).	For	the	EU	countries	in	our	data,	
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real	estate	price	increases	are	particularly	pronounced	in	places	with	high	initial	GDP	per	worker	(see	
Figure	A5).	For	the	US,	Hsieh	and	Moretti	(2019),	estimate	the	aggregate	GDP	costs	of	the	spatial	
misallocation	resulting	from	such	land	use	constraints,	but	no	estimates	are	available	for	the	EU.	
Spatial	Disparities	in	Worklessness	
As	is	well	known,	differences	in	labour	market	institutions	play	an	important	role	in	explaining	
country	variation	in	worklessness	(in	this	journal,	Siebert	1997).	These	institutions	may	also	help	
explain	why	spatial	disparities	in	worklessness	are	more	pronounced.	For	example,	nationally	set	
minimum	wages	could	increase	worklessness	in	poorer	areas:	evidence	for	Germany	suggests	this	
happens	in	some	low	wage	areas	(Ahlfeldt	et	al	2019).	Even	without	binding	minimum	wages	
centralised	wage	bargaining	may	be	a	driver	of	spatial	disparities	in	worklessness	as	such	schemes	
prevent	the	adjustment	of	wages	to	regional	productivity	differences.	Comparing	Italy	and	Germany,	
Boeri	et	al.	(2019)	argue	that	centralized	wage	bargaining	in	Italy	translates	similar	spatial	variations	
in	productivity	into	much	smaller	variation	in	nominal	wages,	but	much	bigger	variations	in	
worklessness.	Our	results	confirm	the	important	role	of	labour	market	institutions:	regressing	metro	
worklessness	rates	against	GDP	per	worker,	we	find	a	negative	coefficient	which	is	more	than	twice	
as	large	for	countries	with	more	centralized	wage	bargaining.6 		
Mobility	and	Spatial	Disparities	
According	to	Molloy	et	al.	(in	this	journal,	2011)	mobility	in	2005	was	significantly	higher	in	the	US	
than	in	the	EU,	which	contributed	to	higher	EU	disparities.	In	contrast	to	the	US	where	mobility	rates	
have	been	falling,	the	EU	trend	is	less	clear	and	mobility	may	have	been	increasing	(EU	Commission	
2018).	Fischer	and	Pfaffermayr	(2018)	suggests	that	labour	mobility	plays	a	small	role	in	reducing	EU	
disparities	in	per-capita	GDP.	Unfortunately,	this	increased	mobility	took	place	against	a	background	
of	increasing	concentration	of	economic	activity	and	sorting	of	high	skilled	towards	big	cities.	There	
is	also	some	evidence	that	regional	transfers	may	slow	down	the	adjustment	that	occurs	via	mobility	
(Egger	et	al.	2014;	Jofre-Monseny	2014).			
	
Place-based	policies	
So	far,	we	considered	factors	that	explain	disparities	across	EU	metros	and	why	these	areas	have	
stopped	converging	and	started	to	diverge.	The	rest	of	the	paper	considers	place-based	policies.	We	
consider	policies	that	explicitly	target	the	spatial	allocation	of	economic	activity.	We	will	not	discuss	
general	national-level	policies	like	schools	funding,	employment	training,	and	others	that	directly	
target	outcomes	like	education	that	matter	for	spatial	disparities,	but	aren’t	necessarily	designed	to	
target	the	issue	of	divergence.	We	focus	on	what	we	know	about	the	impact	of	these	policies	on	
specific	economic	outcomes	such	as	employment	and	how	this	depends	on	the	economic	forces	
driving	spatial	disparities	that	we	discussed	above.	
These	forces	also	affect	the	equity	and	efficiency	of	place-based	policies.	In	distributional	terms,	the	
effect	of	policy	will	be	partly	determined	by	the	mobility	of	individuals	living	in	the	area	targeted	and	
the	housing	supply	elasticity	(Kline	and	Moretti	2014).	For	example,	with	relatively	elastic	supply	of	
labour	across	metros,	but	an	inelastic	housing	supply,	local	benefits	of	spatial	transfers	are	realized	
	
6	Conditional	on	country	fixed	effects	the	effect	of	log	GDP	per	worker	on	non-employment	rates	is	-0.21	in	the	
group	of	countries	with	more	flexible	regional	wage	bargaining	(AT,	DE,	DK,	NL,	SE),	-0.57	in	the	group	with	less	
flexible,	more	centralized	wage	bargaining	(BE,	FI,	FR,	IT,	PT,	SI)	Both	coefficients	are	significant	at	the	1	
percent	level.	
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by	landlords	as	they	capitalize	into	land	prices.	Firm	and	household	mobility	also	increases	the	risk	
that	if	policy	induces	significant	local	employment	effects	in	targeted	areas,	these	may	come	at	the	
cost	of	employment	losses	elsewhere.	Displacement	from	richer	to	poorer	metro	areas	will	
presumably	narrow	disparities.	The	effect	on	overall	output	depends	on	whether	agglomeration	
economies	in	targeted	areas	outweigh	potential	losses	in	non-targeted	areas.	Shifting	investments	
and	jobs	from	prosperous,	productive	areas	to	lagging,	less	productive	regions	is	likely	to	generate	
aggregate	efficiency	costs.	The	effect	of	displacement	on	aggregate	welfare	depends	on	equity	
considerations	and	also	how	it	affects	congestion	externalities:	for	example,	if	displacement	from	
richer	to	poorer	cities	reduces	both	congestion	and	agglomeration	externalities,	the	net	effect	might	
decrease	productivity,	but	increase	welfare	(for	example,	Fajgelbaum	and	Gaubert,	2020;	Henkel	et	
al.	2018).	It	is	unlikely	that	policy-makers	have	enough	information	to	account	for	this	potential	
mixture	of	externalities	(Kline	and	Moretti,	2014).		
EU	Cohesion	Policy	
Reducing	spatial	disparities	in	income	and	worklessness	is	a	long-standing	EU	objective.	
Interventions	directly	funded	by	the	EU	include	investments	in	transport	infrastructure	and	in	local	
public	goods	and	services,	a	mix	of	firm	subsidies	and	human	capital	investments	including	
employment	training.	There	are	three	main	funds:	The	European	Social	Fund,	the	European	Regional	
Development	Fund,	and	the	Cohesion	Fund.	Other	smaller	funds	also	partly	target	less	developed	
regions.		
The	cohesion	policy	budget	for	2014-2020	is	€645	billion	(for	a	detailed	description,	see	
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/).	Total	expenditure	is	around	one-third	of	the	EU	budget,	which	
is	small	relative	to	total	government	expenditure.	That	said,	the	impact	of	EU	policy	is	greater	than	
this	suggests,	because	EU	state	aid	rules	restrict	policy	in	member	states.	The	lion’s	share	of	the	
budget	(60	percent)	goes	towards	‘less-developed’	regions,	with	GDP	per	capita	less	than	75	percent	
of	the	EU	average.	Investments	in	transport	infrastructure,	research	and	development,	and	business	
support	are	the	main	expenditure	categories	accounting	for	45-50	percent	of	the	budget.		
Various	arguments	are	used	to	justify	EU	cohesion	policies.	One	approach	takes	equity	arguments	
used	to	justify	policies	to	reduce	disparities	within	nation-states	and	extends	these	to	an	EU-wide	
policy.	For	example,	if	all	EU	citizens	should	be	entitled	to	similar	public	goods,	EU	policy	may	be	
justified	as	helping	to	equalize	fiscal	capacity.		
From	an	efficiency	perspective,	cohesion	policy	could	lead	to	higher	aggregate	output	if	there	are	
diminishing	returns	to	public	investment,	so	that	investing	in	areas	with	lower	levels	of	public	
investment	will	produce	larger	gains.	Or	the	EU	might	play	a	federal	role	coordinating	investments	
that	exert	cross-area	externalities.	Or	EU	transfers	may	mitigate	externalities	from	fiscal	competition	
among	jurisdictions.	
An	alternative	argument	makes	the	case	for	cohesion	policies	as	a	tool	for	advancing	European	
integration.	For	example,	transfers	may	build	acceptance	of	the	EU	in	new	member	states.	This	may	
be	important	if	integration	generates	economic	growth	at	the	centre	at	the	expense	of	peripheral	
regions	(Puga	2002)	or	if	wealthier	areas	can	set	higher	taxes	because	firms’	desire	to	locate	there	
reduces	tax	competition	(Brülhart	et	al.	2012).		
The	effects	of	EU	cohesion	policies	have	been	studied	extensively.	Clear	eligibility	criteria,	strictly	
applied	and	largely	unchanged	since	1989,	allow	for	a	(quasi-)experimental	situation	in	which	NUTS2	
regions	with	GDP	per	capita	slightly	below	the	75	percent	threshold	receive	substantial	transfers	and	
can	be	compared	to	regions	slightly	above	the	threshold	that	do	not.	Becker	et	al.	(2010)	use	this	
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threshold	to	identify	the	effect	of	transfers	using	a	regression	discontinuity	design.	On	average,	
transfers	appear	to	have	been	effective	in	fostering	growth	in	recipients	and	thus	reducing	
disparities	(Becker	et	al.	2010,	Mohl	and	Hagen	2010,	Pellegrini	et	al,	2013,	Giua	2017).		
However,	the	effects	vary	considerably	across	areas	depending	on	local	conditions.	The	positive	
effects	are	driven	by	regions	with	high	human	capital,	as	measured	by	education	of	the	workforce,	
and	high-quality	local	government,	as	measured	by	survey	data	about	public	services	(Becker	et	al.	
2013).	Transfers	are	ineffective	elsewhere.	One	potential	reason	is	that	while	member	states	agree	
strategy	and	budgets,	selection	of	projects	is	done	by	regional	authorities.	Lower-quality	local	
governments	may	choose	ineffective	policy.	Or	worse,	may	be	more	susceptible	to	increased	rent-
seeking	activities	and	white-collar	crime	(Accetturo	et	al.	2014;	de	Angelis	et	al.	2018).	
The	empirical	evidence	also	suggests	decreasing	returns	from	cohesion	transfers.	Becker	et	al	(2012)	
and	Cerqua	and	Pellegrini	(2018)	estimate	the	effects	of	transfer	intensity	(defined	as	transfers	
relative	to	local	GDP).	Their	results	imply	that	the	marginal	treatment	effect	declines	with	higher	
intensity	and	becomes	zero	at	some	“maximum	desirable	treatment	intensity.”	One	explanation	is	
that	limits	to	institutional	capacity	mean	that	additional	subsidies	are	used	with	increasing	
inefficiency.	Alternatively,	the	returns	to	investment	may	decrease	in	a	way	consistent	with	a	
neoclassical	aggregate	production	function	so	even	high-quality	governments	see	decreasing	
returns.	The	literature	does	not	discriminate	between	these	two	explanations.	
Finally,	a	key	question	is	whether	transfers	lead	to	a	temporary	or	permanent	improvements.	The	
evidence	is	inconclusive,	but	raises	doubts	that	effects	are	long-lived.	For	example,	case	studies	of	
the	Italian	Abruzzi	region	and	the	UK’s	South	Yorkshire	region,	which	lost	eligibility	in	1996	and	2006	
(respectively)	suggest	improvements	were	temporary	(Barone	et	al.	2016;	Di	Cataldo	2017).	Becker	
et	al.	(2018)	look	at	all	areas	which	lost	eligibility,	finding	on	average	reversion	to	pre-transfer	
trajectories	once	funds	are	cut.		
The	findings	raise	several	questions	about	ways	to	improve	cohesion	policy.	For	example,	should	the	
EU	allow	for	a	longer	transition	period	when	areas	become	ineligible	for	subsidies?	Are	transfers	
well-targeted	at	investments	that	improve	long-run	growth?	Given	the	importance	of	human	capital	
to	the	effectiveness	of	subsidies	—both	directly	in	labour	markets	and	indirectly	through	improving	
local	institutional	quality—perhaps	human	capital	should	be	a	higher	priority	than,	say,	
infrastructure?	Similarly,	given	that	effectiveness	decreases	as	transfers	increase,	would	it	make	
sense	to	transfer	some	subsidies	from	regions	with	a	higher	ratio	of	subsidies	to	GDP	to	regions	with	
a	lower	ratio?		
All	the	evidence	is	for	regions	rather	than	metros.	Given	the	economic	importance	of	metros	and	the	
difference	between	urban	and	rural	economies	more	should	be	done	to	understand	the	differential	
impacts	of	cohesion	policy.	As	metros	are	on	average	more	highly	educated,	and	human	capital	and	
GDP	per	capita	matter	for	effectiveness,	the	efficiency	of	the	funds	may	be	increased	by	targeting	
metros	that	are	relatively	high	skilled	compared	to	surrounding	regions.	At	the	same	time,	the	
increased	sorting	of	more	educated	workers	means	that	declining	areas,	which	are	losing	their	more	
educated	labour	force,	will	also	be	less	able	to	transform	transfers	into	growth.	This	raises	questions	
around	place-based	policies	that	target	skilled	labour,	an	issue	to	which	we	return	below.	
So	far,	we	have	focused	on	the	overall	effect	of	EU	cohesion	policy	considering	the	effects	of	
transfers	consisting	of	a	bundle	of	interventions.	Blouri	and	Ehrlich	(2020)	find	that	there	is	
significant	variation	across	interventions	in	their	effects.	Thus,	we	next	consider	the	impact	of	
different	policies,	drawing	on	cross-EU	studies	and	papers	looking	at	national	policies.		
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Transport	Infrastructure	
A	substantial	share	of	EU	cohesion	spending	is	on	transport	infrastructure:	18	percent	in	2014-20,	
down	from	25	percent	in	2007-13.	Nation-state	infrastructure	investment	is	many	times	larger.	One	
way	of	thinking	about	infrastructure	projects	is	as	a	public	capital	input	that	makes	firms	more	
productive	(Aschauer,	1989).	This	assumes	decreasing	returns	to	infrastructure	investment,	
consistent	with	the	findings	for	EU	cohesion	policy.	More	recent	literature	has	emphasised	the	
importance	of	thinking	about	the	transport	network.	Changing	the	network	affects	firm	access	to	
goods	markets	and	input	factors	and	worker	access	to	jobs.	As	these	determine	the	relative	
attractiveness	of	places,	infrastructure	may	affect	the	location	of	firms	and	workers,	shaping	the	
spatial	distribution	of	activity.	For	an	overview	of	theory	and	empirics	on	the	impact	of	transport	
infrastructure,	see	Redding	and	Turner	2015.		
Recent	empirical	evidence	has	looked	at	these	effects	using	the	impact	of	road	investments.	For	
example,	looking	at	incremental	changes	in	UK	road	infrastructure,	Gibbons	et	al	(2019)	find	
substantial	positive	effects	on	area	employment	and	number	of	establishments.	While	employment	
gains	are	largely	driven	by	firm	entry,	some	firm-level	analysis	also	finds	productivity	increases	for	
incumbent	firms.	Holl	(2016)	provides	such	evidence	for	improved	highway	access	in	Spain	which	
also	increased	economic	activity	close	to	highways.	These	studies	show	sizable	local	effects	but	may	
not	identify	aggregate	effects	when	improvements	affect	the	entire	network.	
A	central	aim	of	the	EU	is	to	increase	integration	by	lowering	transaction	costs,	thus	potentially	
causing	fundamental	changes	in	economic	geography.	For	example,	the	Trans-European	Network	is	
a	key	project	that	aims	to	improve	integration.	However,	there	are	long-running	debates	about	the	
spatial	effects	of	infrastructure	in	the	“New	Economic	Geography”	research	(Krugman	1991;	Fujita	et	
al.	1999;	Puga	2001;	Baldwin	et	al.	2003)	For	example,	the	“two-way	roads”	problem	points	out	that	
transport	improves	the	access	of	firms	in	less	developed	regions	to	core	markets,	but	also	increases	
core	firms	access	to	less-developed	regions.	As	a	result,	transport	investments	may	increase	or	
decrease	industrial	concentration.	Overall,	this	literature	suggests	that	the	effect	on	spatial	
disparities	depends	on	several	factors:	the	reduction	in	trade	costs,	wage	differences,	congestion	
costs,	and	mobility.		
Unfortunately,	the	two-region	structure	common	in	these	earlier	models	proved	hard	to	adapt	to	
multi-region	settings	and	complex	transport	networks.		
More	recent	spatial	economic	models	eliminate	the	possibility	of	multiple-equilibrium	but	more	
easily	incorporate	realistic	multi-region	geography	(Allen	and	Arkolakis	2014;	Redding	and	Rossi-
Hansberg	2017).	Once	fitted	to	real	world	data,	such	models	can	assess	the	relative	contribution	of	
location,	market	access	and	local	(perhaps	innate?)	productivity	differences	in	explaining	spatial	
disparities.	They	can	also	quantify	the	effects	of	changes	to	transport	networks	on	the	spatial	
distribution	of	employment,	income	and	aggregate	welfare	while	allowing	for	displacement.			
Santamaria	(2019)	uses	this	approach	to	quantify	the	welfare	effects	of	reshaping	the	West	German	
highways	network	after	World	War	II	and	finds	that	this	generated	large	persistent	income	gains.	
Allen	and	Arkolakis	(2019)	derive	a	framework	to	compute	the	welfare	impact	of	local	infrastructure	
improvements	in	the	presence	of	agglomeration	and	congestion	externalities.	Even	without	
relocation,	the	welfare	effects	spread	over	the	network	through	changes	in	price	indices.	Blouri	and	
Ehrlich	(2020)	use	a	similar	model	to	consider	the	general	equilibrium	impact	of	EU	infrastructure	
investments.	Investments	increase	local	productivity	and	this,	combined	with	reduced	transport	
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costs,	generates	significant	aggregate	welfare	gains—but	only	a	relatively	small	reduction	in	income	
disparities.	The	utility-maximizing	distribution	of	investments	suggests	that	funds	should	be	
redistributed	towards	more	central	regions	and	some	border	regions.	Unfortunately,	this	
redistribution	is	predicted	to	increase	spatial	income	inequality,	once	again	highlighting	the	trade-off	
between	aggregate	efficiency	and	spatial	disparities.7	
Can	transport	infrastructure	investments	explain	the	recent	divergence	across	metro	areas?	Initial	
investments	in	the	Trans-European	Networks	may	have	mostly	completed	national	networks,	and	
the	associated	increase	in	public	capital	stock	could	have	driven	between-country	convergence	in	
the	1980s.	However,	if	later	investment	did	more	to	complete	the	cross-country	network	or	were	
targeted	more	to	core	areas,	the	contribution	to	convergence	would	be	reduced.		
Again,	much	of	the	available	evidence	considers	regions	rather	than	metros.	These	leaves	questions	
about	place-based	policy	that	have	not	been	widely	addressed.		If	reallocating	transport	expenditure	
towards	more	central	regions	maximizes	aggregate	efficiency,	would	this	also	hold	true	within	
regions?	Transport	investment	may	also	interact	with	educational	composition:	for	example,	public	
transport	in	big	cities	may	attract	more	educated	workers,	thus	helping	explain	increased	sorting.	
This	has	not	been	studied	for	Europe	as	a	whole,	but	Fretz	et	al.	(2019)	study	effects	of	the	
construction	of	the	Swiss	highway	network,	showing	that	improved	access	for	municipalities	led	to	a	
significant	increase	in	their	share	of	high-income	households.			
Capital	Subsidies	and	Enterprise	Zones	
Governments	offer	subsidies	to	specific	firms,	particularly	in	disadvantaged	areas.	Such	subsidies	
raise	two	major	concerns:	the	“deadweight”	problem	that	they	finance	activities	that	firms	would	
have	undertaken	anyhow;	and	the	“displacement”	problem	that	if	subsidies	encourage	new	activity	
in	targeted	areas,	this	may	come	at	the	cost	of	activity	elsewhere.		
Research	seeking	to	understanding	the	deadweight	and	displacement	effects	from	EU	policies	
struggles	with	a	lack	of	detailed	data	and	substantial	identification	challenges	(see	e.g.	Bachtrögler	
and	Hammer	(2018)	and	Beņkovskis	et	al.	(2019).		
Country-level	studies	have	made	more	progress	because	one	(unintended)	consequence	of	EU	state	
aid	rules	is	that	they	induce	exogenous	variation	to	identify	the	impact	of	place-based	capital	
subsidies.	Some	studies	suggest	that	subsidies,	if	well	designed,	can	alter	firm	behavior	(i.e.	not	all	
the	impacts	are	deadweight).	For	example,	Criscuolo	et	al.	(2019)	look	at	the	impact	of	the	UK’s	
Regional	Selective	Assistance	scheme,	which	provided	discretionary	grants	to	manufacturing	firms	in	
disadvantaged	areas.	The	rules	governing	area	eligibility	are	determined	by	EU	rules.	Thus,	changes	
in	EU	rules	provide	a	source	of	exogenous	variation	for	estimating	the	impact	on	employment,	
unemployment	and	other	firm	outcomes.	Subsidies	have	large	and	statistically	significant	effects:	
increasing	area	level	manufacturing	employment	and	decreasing	unemployment.	These	effects	are	
driven	by	small	firms.	Similar	strategies	have	been	used	for	other	place-based	capital	schemes	
including	the	GRW	in	Germany	(Brachert	et	al.	2019;	Etzel	et	al.	2020)	and	Law	488/1992	in	Italy	
(Bronzini	and	de	Blasio	2006).	The	results	are	not	always	positive.	Bronzini	and	de	Blasio	(2006)	find	
evidence	of	substantial	deadweight	and	displacement:	subsidized	firms	bring	forward	investment	
projects	and	gains	may	come	at	the	expense	of	non-subsidized	firms.	
	
7	Further	welfare	gains	can	be	realized	by	supra-national	coordination	of	infrastructure—for	example,	if	
governments	ignore	foreign	consumers	when	deciding	on	investment	in	border	regions	(Felbermayr	and	
Tarassov	2019).	
14	
	
Enterprise	zones,	in	most	incarnations,	offer	a	broader	set	of	subsidies	(not	just	capital	subsidies),	
some	of	which	may	offer	indirect	support	to	firms	(like	relaxation	of	planning	regulations),	but	in	a	
specific	area	often	much	smaller	than	a	metro	area.	Most	of	the	literature	on	enterprise	zones	
comes	from	the	US	(Neumark	and	Simpson	provide	a	summary),	but	a	small	literature	considers	the	
effect	of	European	schemes,	particularly	the	French	Franches	Urbaines	(for	example,	Briant	et	al.	
2013;	Mayer	et	al.	2017;	Givord	et	al.	2013;	Gobillon	et	al.	2012).	
One	difference	that	emerges	is	that	US	enterprise	zones	have	larger	impacts	on	area	unemployment,	
which	may	reflect	the	fact	that	some	US	schemes	impose	“local	hiring	conditions,”	(usually	that	a	
certain	percentage	of	workers	must	live	locally)	which	are	not	used	in	Europe.		
Another	difference	is	that	deadweight	and	displacement	concerns	are	more	pronounced	for	
enterprise	zones	than	for	place-based	capital	subsidies	operating	at	broader	spatial	scales.	One	
explanation	is	that	the	latter	are	often	selective.	For	example,	to	be	eligible	to	receive	UK	Regional	
Selective	Assistance,	a	firm	must	demonstrate	that	it	does	not	predominantly	serve	local	markets.	
Such	a	requirement	may	reduce	displacement	compared	to	enterprise	zones	that	provide	non-
discretionary	subsidies	to	all	firms	within	the	zone.	A	second	explanation	is	that	a	firm	relocating	to	
an	enterprise	zone	within	the	same	metro	can	access	the	same	local	labor	markets	and	do	business	
with	existing	customers	and	suppliers.	In	the	absence	of	a	local	hiring	requirement,	it	can	even	
employ	the	same	workers.	This	creates	large	incentives	to	re-locate	within	metros.	In	contrast,	firms	
relocating	to	take	advantage	of	other	place-based	capital	subsidies	may	need	to	move	to	different	
local	labour	markets	and	face	differential	access	to	customers	and	suppliers.		
We	have	little	evidence	on	the	efficient	spatial	allocation	of	these	area-based	initiatives.	As	one	
example,	Gaubert	(2019)	studies	the	location	choice	of	heterogeneous	firms	when	offered	firm	
subsidies	to	locate	in	difference	size	cities.	In	the	model	(calibrated	to	the	French	ZFU	programme),	
firm	subsidies	in	small,	less	productive	cities	lead	to	displacement	which	has	negative	effects	on	
aggregate	productivity.	Transfers	to	large,	productive	cities	increase	aggregate	productivity.		
The	effects	of	these	policies	on	spatial	disparities	will	be	modest.		If	the	findings	for	UK	Regional	
Selective	Assistance	generalize,	selective	(capital)	subsidies	may	reduce	disparities	in	worklessness	
but	not	GDP	per	capita.	For	the	scale	at	which	enterprise	zones	operate,	and	given	the	findings	on	
displacement,	it	is	unlikely	that	these	have	much	impact	on	metro	disparities	in	the	EU.	
Local	Employment	Multipliers		
Firm-level	subsidies	aim	to	support	employment	at	an	individual	firm,	or	to	attract	new	employers	to	
an	area.	This	should	directly	increase	local	employment,	providing	that	subsidised	employment	does	
not	displace	existing	jobs.	This	increased	local	employment	may	generate	additional	jobs	by	
increasing	productivity	(as	in	Greenstone	et	al.	2010)	or	demand	for	locally	produced	goods	and	
services.	These	positive	“multipliers”	may	be	offset	by	general	equilibrium	effects	that	increase	local	
wages	or	prices.		
The	literature	on	local	multipliers	assesses	the	net	effect	on	local	employment.	The	evidence	
considers	multipliers	from	three	kinds	of	employment:	in	tradable	sectors	(that	sell	mostly	outside	
the	local	economy);	in	tradable	skilled	and	high-tech	sectors;	and	in	the	public	sector.	The	multiplier	
for	jobs	in	tradable	sectors	on	jobs	in	non-tradable	sectors	is	the	most	frequently	estimated.	
Estimates	for	Italy,	Spain,	Sweden,	and	the	United	Kingdom	differ,	although	are	broadly	in	line	with	
US	estimates.	These	suggest	that	an	additional	tradable	job	creates	between	0.5	and	1.5	extra	jobs	
in	the	non-tradable	sector.	A	smaller	number	of	studies	provide	estimates	for	high-tech	or	high-
skilled	tradables,	generally	finding	larger	multipliers	(again,	consistent	with	US	evidence).	
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The	fact	that	these	multipliers	are	higher	might	provide	an	additional	justification,	over	and	above	
the	direct	effect	on	innovation,	for	policies	that	support	the	clustering	and	collaboration	of	firms	in	
R&D-intensive	sectors.	However,	evidence	on	the	effectiveness	of	these	policies	is	mixed.	For	
example,	for	Germany,	Falck	et	al.	(2010)	document	positive	effects	on	innovation,	whereas	Martin	
et	al.	(2011)	and	Falck	et	al.	(2019)	tend	to	find	no	effects	on	regional	employment	in	France	and	
Germany,	respectively.	Moreover,	these	studies	ignore	the	negative	aggregate	effect	of	spreading	
out	activities	that	may	benefit	from	large	agglomeration	economies.	It	also	ignores	the	possibility	
that	price	effects,	like	higher	prices	of	housing,	may	outweigh	any	employment	effects	for	the	lower	
skilled	(Lee	et	al.	2018).			
Decisions	about	public	sector	employment	allow	governments	to	affect	the	spatial	allocation	of	
employment	directly.	For	example,	central	government	employment	is	usually	concentrated	in	the	
capital	city.	Re-allocation	of	public	sector	employment	from	richer	to	poorer	areas	provides	a	direct	
mechanism	for	reducing	disparities.		
Some	studies	estimate	multiplier	effects	for	these	public	sector	jobs	(Faggio	and	Overman	2014).	
The	What	Works	Centre	for	Local	Economic	Growth	(2019)	identified	six	such	studies.	Results	are	
mixed,	with	two	finding	negative	effects	on	private	sector	employment	(that	is,	crowding	out),	one	
finding	no	effect,	and	three	finding	positive	multipliers.	Two	of	these	three	report	crowding	out	for	
manufacturing,	offset	by	a	positive	multiplier	on	services.	Increases	in	wages	or	house	prices	seem	to	
underpin	these	crowding	out	effects.	Overall,	estimated	public	sector	multipliers	are	smaller	than	
private	sector.	One	explanation	is	that	public	sector	employers	may	have	weaker	input-output	
linkages	with	local	firms.	Another	is	that	salaries	are	relatively	high	in	relocated	public	sector	jobs,	
consistent	with	both	larger	price	effects	on	wages	and	housing	and	higher	levels	of	crowding	out.		
	
Conclusion	
EU	Spatial	disparities	are	profound,	persistent	and	may	be	widening.	Thinking	about	the	role	of	
metros	and	the	sorting	of	workers	helps	better	understand	these	disparities	and	the	effect	of	
different	policies	and	complements	the	extensive	literature	on	regional	disparities.	The	findings	that	
EU	support	is	more	effective	in	higher	educated	regions,	on	the	intensity	of	transfers	and	the	impact	
of	transport	raise	questions	about	whether	funds	should	be	targeted	more	at	metros.	Regardless	of	
the	intervention,	our	understanding	of	many	place-based	policies	is	improved	if	we	think	about	the	
effects	from	a	metro	perspective.			
Our	discussion	has	raised	several	questions	without	answering	them,	and	here	is	one	more.	At	least	
as	far	back	as	Akerlof	et	al.	(1991),	economists	have	raised	the	possibility	of	employment	subsidies	
to	help	address	EU	disparities	and	reduce	the	risk	of	“downward	spirals”	arising	from	large	localized	
negative	shocks.	But	the	emphasis	of	EU	cohesion	policy	has	remained	on	infrastructure	investment	
and	physical	capital	subsidies.	Perhaps	the	set	of	cohesion	policy	instruments	needs	to	be	
expanded?		
Historically,	arguments	between	proponents	of	place-based	or	place-blind	policies	have	been	
conducted	as	an	either-or	debate.		In	a	world	where	some	people	are	mobile,	and	others	are	not,	we	
do	not	find	this	distinction	helpful.		
Instead	we	need	to	understand	the	impacts	of	a	range	of	different	policies	regardless	of	whether	
they	are	targeted	at	people	or	at	places.	The	cost-effectiveness,	the	consequences	for	spatial	
disparities,	and	the	benefits	for	different	kinds	of	people	living	in	different	places,	are	likely	to	vary	
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significantly	across	policies.	It	is	unlikely	that	a	priori	classifications	of	policy	as	place-based	or	place-
blind	will	be	very	informative	about	these	differential	impacts	on	redistribution	and	aggregate	
efficiency,	and	the	tradeoffs	between	them.			
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Online	Appendix:	
Data	Sources	
Our	main	data	is	from	Eurostat	and	the	EU	Joint	Research	Centre’s	(EUJRC)	regional	database.	We	
use	the	2016	NUTS3	level	classification.	For	data	provided	according	to	the	2010	or	2013	NUTS	
classification	we	apply	the	mapping	provided	by	EUJRC	to	assign	the	corresponding	2016	NUTS3	
regions	(https://urban.jrc.ec.europa.eu/nutsconverter/#/).	We	exclude	the	French	overseas	
territories,	the	Canary	Islands,	the	autonomous	regions	Ceuta	and	Melilla,	and	the	autonomous	
regions	Azores	and	Madeira.	We	restrict	the	data	to	the	EU15	for	the	period	1980-2003	and	cover	
the	EU28	from	2004	to	2015.	
Information	about	real	estate	price	indices,	used	to	produce	Figure	3b,	is	available	for	France,	
Germany,	Italy,	Spain,	and	England.	We	collect	this	information	from	several	sources.	Data	for	
France	comes	from	MeilleursAgents	and	covers	Paris,	top10	and	top50	cities	between	2007	and	
2015.	The	index	for	Germany	is	based	on	the	Regional	Real	Estate	Price	Indices	for	Germany	(RWI-
GEO-REDv1)	constructed	by	Boelmann	and	Schaffner	(2019)	and	covers	real	estate	advertisement	
data	for	individual	units	between	2007	and	2019	which	we	assigned	to	NUTS3	regions.	Information	
for	Italy	is	obtained	from	the	Osservatorio	Mobiliare	Italiano	and	contains	transaction-level	data	on	
residential	real	estate	sales	in	Italian	provinces	between	2007	and	2011;	For	Spain	we	use	the	Indice	
de	Mercados	Immobiliarios	Espanoles	provided	by	TINSA	on	the	city	level	for	2001	to	2015.	The	data	
for	English	cities	(we	lack	Scotland,	Northern	Ireland,	and	Wales)	is	based	on	Hilber	and	Mense	
(2019)	covering	Local	Planning	Authorities	between	2000	and	2015.	
Information	about	tertiary	education	rates,	used	to	produce	column	2	of	Table	1,	is	provided	by	
EUJRC	at	NUTS2	level	and	we	assign	each	NUTS3	region	the	education	rate	of	the	corresponding	
upper	tier	NUTS2	region.		
Micro	level	information	on	earnings,	education	and	residential	information,	used	to	estimate	the	
mincer	regressions	reported	in	the	text,	is	provided	by	the	EU	Statistics	on	Income	and	Living	
Conditions.	We	focus	in	our	analysis	on	the	cross-section	for	2015	while	the	results	are	robust	to	
using	different	years	(in	principle	the	data	is	available	since	2004	with	some	differences	in	the	
coverage	of	countries).		
EU	Metro	Regions	
As	discussed	in	the	text,	we	use	the	recent	EC/OECD	specification	of	metropolitan	regions	that	
provide	a	consistent	definition	for	the	whole	EU.	Details	on	how	these	are	constructed	can	be	found	
in	OECD	(2019).	The	following	text,	taken	from	p.3	of	that	report,	provides	a	short	definition.	
A	functional	urban	area	can	be	defined	in	four	steps:	
1. Identify	an	urban	centre:	a	set	of	contiguous,	high	density	(1,500	residents	per	square	
kilometre)	grid	cells	with	a	population	of	50,000	in	the	contiguous	cells;	
2. Identify	a	city:	one	or	more	local	units	that	have	at	least	50	percent	of	their	residents	inside	an	
urban	centre;	
3. Identify	a	commuting	zone:	a	set	of	contiguous	local	units	that	have	at	least	15	percent	of	
their	employed	residents	working	in	the	city;	
4. A	functional	urban	area	is	the	combination	of	the	city	with	its	commuting	zone.	
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We	use	the	version	that	defines	metropolitan-regions	(‘metros’)	in	terms	of	NUTS3	or	aggregates	of	
NUTS3,	as	appropriate.	Table	A1	provides	a	list	of	the	metro-regions	by	country,	while	table	A2	
provides	basic	descriptive	statistics.		
Table	A1:		
Metros	by	country	
	
AT	 Lübeck	 FI	 Palermo	 Ploieşti	
Graz	 Magdeburg	 Helsinki	 Parma	 Timisoara	
Innsbruck	 Mainz	 Tampere	 Prato	 SE	
Linz	
Mannheim-
Ludwigshafen	 Turku	
Reggio	
nell'Emilia	 Göteborg	
Salzburg	 Mönchengladbach	 FR	 Roma	 Malmö	
Wien	 München	 Amiens	 Taranto	 Stockholm	
BE	 Münster	 Angers	 Torino	 Uppsala	
Antwerpen	 Neubrandenburg	 Annecy	 Venezia	 SI	
Bruxelles	/	Brussel	 Nürnberg	 Besanþon	 Verona	 Ljubljana	
Charleroi	 Offenburg	 Bordeaux	 LT	 Maribor	
Gent	 Oldenburg		 Brest	 Kaunas	 SK	
Liège	 Osnabrück	 Caen	 Vilnius	 Bratislava	
BG	 Paderborn	 Clermont-Ferrand	 LU	 Košice	
Burgas	 Pforzheim	 Dijon	 Luxembourg	 UK	
Plovdiv	 Regensburg	 Grenoble	 LV	 Aberdeen	
Sofia	 Reutlingen	 Le	Mans	 Riga	 Belfast	
Varna	 Rosenheim	
Lille	-	Dunkerque	-	
Valenciennes	 MT	
Blackburn	-	Blackpool	-	
Preston	
CY	 Rostock	 Limoges	 Valletta	 Bournemouth	
Lefkosia	 Ruhrgebiet	 Lyon	 NL	 Bradford	
CZ	 Saarbrücken	 Marseille	 Amsterdam	 Brighton	and	Hove	
Brno	 Schweinfurt	 Montpellier	
Arnhem	-	
Nijmegen	 Bristol	
Ostrava	 Schwerin	 Mulhouse	 Breda	 Cambridge	
Plzen	 Siegen	 Nancy	 Eindhoven	 Cardiff	
Praha	 Stuttgart	 Nantes	 Enschede	
Cheshire	West	and	
Chester	
DE	 Ulm	 Nice	 Groningen	 Colchester	
Aachen	 Wetzlar	 Nimes	 Leeuwarden	 Coventry	
Aschaffenburg	 Wiesbaden	 Orléans	 Leiden	 Derby	
Augsburg	 Wuppertal	 Paris	 Rotterdam	 Doncaster	
Bayreuth	 Würzburg	 Pau	 Tilburg	 Dundee	
Berlin	 Zwickau	 Perpignan	 Utrecht	 Edinburgh	
Bielefeld	 DK	 Poitiers	 Zwolle	 Exeter	
Bocholt	 Aalborg	 Reims	 s'	Gravenhage	 Glasgow	
Bonn	 København	 Rennes	 PL	 Ipswich	
Braunschweig-Salzgitter-
Wolfsburg	 Odense	 Rouen	-	Le	Havre	 Bialystok	 Kingston	upon	Hull	
Bremen	 Århus	 Saint-Etienne	 Bielsko-Biala	 Kirklees	
Bremerhaven	 EE	 Strasbourg	
Bydgoszcz	-	
Torún	 Leeds	
Darmstadt	 Tallinn	 Toulouse	 Czestochowa	 Leicester	
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Dresden	 EL	 Tours	 Gdansk	 Liverpool	
Düren	 Athina	 HR	 Katowice	 London	
Düsseldorf	 Thessaloniki	 Grad	Zagreb	 Kielce	 Manchester	
Erfurt	 ES	 Split	 Kraków	 Medway	
Flensburg	 A	Coruña	 HU	 Lublin	 Middlesbrough	
Frankfurt	am	Main	
Alicante/Alacant	-	
Elche/Elx	 Budapest	 Lódz	 Newcastle	upon	Tyne	
Freiburg	im	Breisgau	 Barcelona	 Debrecen	 Olsztyn	 Northampton	
Gießen	 Bilbao	 Miskolc	 Opole	 Norwich	
Görlitz	 Cádiz	 Pécs	 Poznan	 Nottingham	
Göttingen	 Córdoba	 Székesfehérvár	 Radom	 Oxford	
Halle	an	der	Saale	 Granada	 IE	 Rzeszów	 Plymouth	
Hamburg	 Guipúzcoa	 Cork	 Szczecin	 Portsmouth	
Hannover	 Madrid	 Dublin	 Tarnów	 Sheffield	
Heidelberg	 Murcia	-	Cartagena	 IT	 Warszawa	 Southampton	
Heilbronn	 Málaga	-	Marbella	 Bari	 Wroclaw	 Stoke-on-Trent	
Hildesheim	 Oviedo	-	Gijón	 Bergamo	 PT	 Sunderland	
Ingolstadt	 Palma	de	Mallorca	 Bologna	 Coimbra	 Swansea	
Iserlohn	 Pamplona/Iruña	 Brescia	 Lisboa	
West	Midlands	urban	
area	
Kaiserslautern	 Santander	 Cagliari	 Porto	 	
Karlsruhe	 Sevilla	 Catania	 RO	 	
Kassel	 Valencia	 Firenze	 Brasov	 	
Kiel	 Valladolid	 Genova	 Bucuresti	 	
Koblenz	 Vigo	 Messina	 Cluj-Napoca	 	
Konstanz	 Vitoria/Gasteiz	 Milano	 Constanta	 	
Köln	 Zaragoza	 Napoli	 Craiova	 	
Leipzig	 	 Padova	 Galati	 	
	 	 	 Iasi	 	
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Table	A2		
Summary	statistics	EU	metros	
 Obs.	 Mean	 Std.dev.	 Min	 Max	
Year	1980	 	 	 	 	 	
Population	(1000)		 215	 985	 1,252	 205	 11,206	
GDP	per	capita			 215	 7,879	 2,464	 2,476	 19,608	
Employment	(1000)	 215	 422	 607	 91	 6,016	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	1990	 	 	 	 	 	
Population	(1000)		 215	 1,015	 1,282	 212	 11,254	
GDP	per	capita		 215	 16,580	 4,375	 8,384	 30,685	
Employment	(1000)	 215	 457	 654	 100	 6,417	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	2000	 	 	 	 	 	
Population	(1000)		 226	 1,044	 1,328	 226	 11,932	
GDP	per	capita			 226	 23,364	 5,983	 11,538	 48,663	
Employment	(1000)	 226	 491	 690	 89	 6,616	
Tertiary	share	(%)	 212	 21.4	 6.5	 3.3	 38.5	
Worklessness	share	(%)	 211	 30.7	 9.7	 8.5	 58.7	
      
Year	2005      
Population	(1000)	 279	 1,042	 1,270	 236	 12,316	
GDP	per	capita	(1000)		 279	 24,522	 8,197	 6,254	 57,328	
Employment	(1000) 279	 493	 657	 98	 6,692	
Tertiary	share 271	 23.0	 7.4	 7.8	 42.3	
Worklessness	share 264	 31.0	 9.5	 0.9	 57.1	
      
Year	2015      
Population	(1000)	 279	 1,088	 1,366	 248	 13,839	
GDP	per	capita	 279	 30,182	 9,839	 11,210	 76,152	
Employment	(1000) 260	 522	 725	 96	 7,874	
Tertiary	share	(%) 260	 30.3	 8.5	 11.57	 52.4	
Worklessness	share	(%) 260	 28.2	 11.6	 -4.3	 57.3	
Notes:	We	summarize	the	data	for	1980-2000	for	EU15	metros	and	2000-15	for	EU28	metros.	Until	1990	we	
lack	data	for	11	East-German	metros.	The	share	of	tertiary	education	is	imputed	using	NUTS2	level	data	and	
is	available	only	since	2000.	Worklessness	is	computed	using	employment	data	and	population	counts	for	
the	age	group	15-64	which	is	available	since	2000.	We	lack	data	on	employment	for	metros	in	Lithuania	and	
Poland.	A	negative	value	of	workessness	share	applied	in	Luxembourg	where	cross	border	commuting	is	
common.	
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Spatial	Disparities	in	Europe:	Additional	Figures	
Figure	A1		
Coefficient	of	Variation	of	GDP	per	capita	–	Metropolitan	areas	EU15,	and	US	
	
	
Source:	Authors	
Notes:	Calculations	based	on	OECD	data	and	the	definition	of	OECD	metro	areas.	
		
Figure	A2:	Beta	Convergence–	EU15	Metro	Regions	
	
Notes:	Authors’	own	calculations.	We	report	the	coefficients	and	95%	confidence	intervals	for	standard	beta	
convergence	regressions.	For	the	EU28,	we	can	only	compute	the	beta	coefficient	for	2005	to	2015.	Consistent	
with	the	CV,	we	observe	significant	beta	convergence	(coefficient	0.031,	significant	at	the	1	percent	level)	as	
the	metros	of	the	new	EU	member	states	catch	up	to	the	EU15.	
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Figure	A3		
Change	in	the	share	of	population	with	tertiary	education	2015-2000	–	EU15	Metros	
	
Notes:	The	coefficient	for	the	linear	regression	illustrated	by	the	straight	line	is	1.99	(significant	at	the	1	
percent	level).	With	country	fixed	effects	the	coefficient	is	1.36.	If	we	use	the	log	of	initial	population	with	
tertiary	education	instead	of	log	of	population	the	coefficient	is	1.62	(with	country	fixed	effects).	
	
	
Figure	A4	
Change	in	the	number	of	patents	2010(12)-1985(81)	–	EU15	Metros	
	
Notes:	The	straight	line	represents	the	45-degree	line.		
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Figure	A5		
Change	in	real	estate	price	index	and	initial	productivity	–	EU15	Metro	areas	
	
Notes:	The	coefficient	for	the	linear	regression	illustrated	by	the	straight	line	is	0.025	(significant	at	the	1	
percent	level).	The	scatter	plot	and	the	regression	are	conditional	on	country	fixed	effects.	We	use	the	period	
2005-2015.	For	Italy	we	only	have	data	until	2011.	
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Evidence	on	Agglomeration	Economies	
Table	A3:	Micro	level	evidence	on	agglomeration	economies	–	EU15	in	2015	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
VARIABLES	 Log	income	 Log	income	 Log	income	
		 		 		 		
Log	age	 4.633***	 3.724***	 3.726***		
(0.0703)	 (0.0677)	 (0.0677)	
Log	age	^2	 -0.611***	 -0.473***	 -0.473***	
	 (0.0108)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0104)	
Female	 -0.188***	 -0.230***	 -0.230***	
	 (0.00442)	 (0.00424)	 (0.00424)	
City	 0.115***	 0.0646***	 0.0529***	
	 (0.00489)	 (0.00469)	 (0.00617)	
Tertiary	Education	 	 0.397***	 0.388***	
	
	
(0.00436)	 (0.00531)	
Tertiary	Education	x	City	 	 	 0.0260***	
	
	 	
(0.00887)	
Constant	 1.677***	 3.014***	 3.013***	
	 (0.114)	 (0.109)	 (0.109)	
Observations	
81,349	 81,349	 81,349	
R-squared	 0.395	 0.451	 0.451	
	
Notes:	City	is	unity	if	the	individual	lives	in	a	high-density	area	according	to	Eurostat’s	Degree	of	urbanisation	
(DEGURBA)	classification.	Tertiary	is	unity	if	the	individual	has	completed	the	first	stage	of	tertiary	education	
(not	leading	directly	to	an	advanced	research	qualification)	or	the	second	stage	of	tertiary	education	(leading	
to	an	advanced	research	qualification).	We	drop	self-employed	and	family	workers.	Standard	errors	in	
parentheses;	all	specifications	include	country	fixed	effects.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
Table	A4:	Micro	level	evidence	on	sorting	by	education	–	EU15	in	2015	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
VARIABLES	 City	 City	 City	
	 Linear	models	 Logit	
		 		 		 		
Tertiary	Education	 0.0942***	 0.107***	 0.0913***	
	 (0.00200)	 (0.00192)	 (0.00195)	
Log	age	 -0.0292*	 -0.00830	 -0.0274*	
	 (0.0154)	 (0.0146)	 (0.0154)	
Log	age	^2	 -0.000394	 -0.00328	 -0.000701	
	 (0.00236)	 (0.00223)	 (0.00236)	
Constant	 0.387***	 0.347***	 	
 (0.0244)	 (0.0231)	 	
    
Observations	 275,585	 275,585	 275,585	
R-squared	 0.010	 0.116	 		
Country	fixed	effects	 No	 Yes	 No	
Notes:	City	is	unity	if	the	individual	lives	in	a	high-density	area	according	to	Eurostat’s	Degree	of	urbanisation	
(DEGURBA)	classification.	Tertiary	indication	is	unity	if	the	individual	has	completed	the	first	stage	of	tertiary	
education	(not	leading	directly	to	an	advanced	research	qualification)	or	the	second	stage	of	tertiary	
education	(leading	to	an	advanced	research	qualification).	Column	3	reports	the	marginal	effects	evaluated	
at	the	mean	of	each	variable.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses;	all	specifications	include	country	fixed	effects.	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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EU	NUTS2	Regions	
Although	we	have	reservations	about	the	use	of	NUTS2	regions,	as	discussed	in	the	main	text,	
convergence	across	NUTS2	regions	is	an	important	EU	policy	aim.	One	important	headline	indicator	
of	disparities,	because	it	determines	eligibility	for	the	most	important	EU	regional	funds,	is	whether	
a	NUTS2	region	has	GDP	per	capita	less	than	75	percent	of	the	EU	average.	In	the	EU15	in	2015,	46	
NUTS2	regions	out	of	204,	home	to	19	percent	of	the	population,	were	75	percent	of	the	average	
GDP	per	capita.	In	the	EU28,	the	corresponding	figures	were	72	out	of	262	and	26	percent	of	the	
population.	For	comparison,	6	US	states,	home	to	6	percent	of	the	population,	have	GDP	per	capita	
less	than	75	percent	of	the	US	average.		
In	2015,	the	coefficient	of	variation	(CV)	in	GDP	per	capita	was	0.31	for	EU15	NUTS2	regions	and	0.37	
for	EU28	NUTS2	regions.8	As	for	metros,	variation	across	EU15	and	EU28	countries	explains	around	
half	of	this	variation	(43	percent	and	51	percent,	respectively).9	For	the	EU	15,	regional	disparities	
fell	in	the	1980s,	stabilised	in	the	1990s	before	falling	again	from	around	2000	to	the	mid-2000s	(see	
figure	A6).10	Overall,	the	coefficient	of	variation	fell	from	0.31	in	1980	to	0.26	in	2003.	The	double-
dip	recession	of	2009	and	2012	reversed	this	long-term	trend	and	by	2015	regional	disparities	were	
almost	back	to	their	1980	levels.	For	the	EU28	we	have	a	much	shorter	time	series.	Starting	in	2004,	
when	the	new	members	joined	the	EU,	the	coefficient	of	variation	fell	from	0.38	to	a	low	of	0.36	in	
2009	and	then	remained	at	similar	levels	until	2015.	
Figure	A6		
Variance	coefficient	of	GDP	per	capita	–	NUT2	regions	
	
Notes:	Authors	own	calculations	based	on	NUTS2	regions	as	described	in	the	text.		
	
8	As	discussed	in	the	main	text,	in	2015,	aggregating	the	five	London	NUTS2	reduces	the	EU15	coefficient	of	
variation	by	29	percent	from	0.44	to	0.31.	For	the	population	weighted	version	of	the	coefficient	of	variation	
the	reduction	is	18	percent.	We	therefore	aggregate	the	London	NUTS2.	
9	These	figures	are	based	on	decomposing	the	squared	coefficient	of	variation.	
10	The	figures	report	the	unweighted	coefficients	of	variation.	The	overall	levels	and	trends	for	the	EU15	and	
EU28	are	largely	unchanged	if	we	weight	by	population.		
